By TON Sri Lanka Desk

The existing disturbance in India-Sri Lanka relations caused by the planned docking of the sophisticated Chinese military survey vessel Yuan Wang 5 at Hambantota port is as long series of hiccups in Indo-Lankan strategic relations. The relationship has been seen ups and downs since the two countries became independent in the 1940s.

India has regularly believed that Sri Lanka is vital for its security in the Indian Ocean Region (IOR), and that the island must be within its political and defense perimeter. In difference, Sri Lanka has regularly feel awkward under fear of Indian domination or even absorption due to the unevenness in power, physical proximity, historical links, and ethnic and religious commonalities.

While India has attempted to block the influence of powers thought to be hostile to it, Sri Lanka has cultivated India’s opponents to use them as a check on India’s dominance. The India-Sri Lanka quarrel over the proposed visit of Yuan Wang 5 to Hambantota show the different strategic approach between these two countries.

In the 1950s, Sri Lanka had declared “neutrality” as its foreign policy. Nonetheless this was not sufficient to pacify New Delhi. As long as Sri Lanka is friendly or neutral, India has nothing to worry about, but if there is any danger of this island falling under the domination of a power hostile to India, India cannot tolerate such a situation endangering her vested territorial interests. As Sri Lanka has been described as a permanently-stationed aircraft carrier” off the Indian southern coast.

In 1963, Lankan Prime Minister signed a Maritime Agreement with China to balance its relations with India. This was a year after China invaded India. India feared that the Sino-Lankan agreement could acquire a military dimension at a time when India’s navy was still weak. In 1962-63 India expected Sri Lankan PM to support India in its territorial dispute and war with China, but it did not happened.

After the 1983 anti-Tamil riots in Colombo and the influx of Tamil refugees into Tamil Nadu, India began to back the Tamil militants. But there was an Indian security and geopolitical dimension to the intervention also. India’s motivations and actions vis-à-vis Sri Lanka in the larger perspective of the international and regional strategic and wanted to control her surroundings.

In mid-1987, India stopped the advance of the Sri Lankan army against the Tamil Tiger militants. It pressured Sri Lankan president to sign the India-Sri Lanka Accord in July 1987 and accept an Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF). The Accord made Sri Lanka bar forces inimical to India from using its ports and other facilities.

Nonetheless there was a change in the Delhi-Colombo security equation with China entering Sri Lanka as a big builder of infrastructure. Among the projects, the deep-water port in Hambantota raised the hackles in New Delhi.

The construction of this port will bring China within breathing distance of India’s southern coast where sensitive installations, including power plants, are present. It could also help China in keeping a track of India’s nuclear, space and naval establishments in South India and also serving as a listening post.

In 2014, a Chinese nuclear submarine “Changzheng 2” had docked in Colombo almost coinciding with the visit of Chinese President. In Indian eyes, the docking violated the Indo-Sri Lanka Accord which stipulated that no port in Sri Lanka will be made available for military use by any country in a manner inimical to India’s interests.

However China also has security interests in the Indian Ocean and can no longer accept the Indian Ocean as an ocean only for the Indians. China also alleged that approximately 244 islands from Indian Nicobar and the Andaman archipelago could be used by India as a metal chain to hinder Chinese ships entering the Strait of Malacca.