By Farzana Tamannur (TON Bangladesh)

On Dec 21, 2020, the U.S. Treasury Department declared sanctions on an elite Bangladesh paramilitary force, quoting “severe human rights violence.” It also sanctioned the present director of the Rapid Action Battalion (RAB) and five ex- senior RAB officials, including a travel bar on Benazir Ahmed, now Bangladesh’s top police chief. (The United States furthermore issued sanctions on entities and persons in Myanmar, China, and North Korea.)

The new sanctions came on global Human Rights Day, and it marks the first time Washington ever sanctioned Dhaka, which it has depicted as a key partner. Though the United States likely wants to maintain a sturdy relationship with Bangladesh, the decision has already dealt a blow to bilateral tie. Some Bangladeshi officials have downplayed the effect of the sanctions, however others have slammed them.

Sanctioning the RAB makes sense from a human rights viewpoint: The force has carried out more than 1,200 extrajudicial killing and 170 enforced disappearance in the precedent two decades, according to Bangladeshi human rights group Odhikar. It makes less sense from a geopolitical viewpoint. The United States has stressed partnership with Bangladesh, suggesting a keenness to overlook its human rights record. A 2019 U.S. State Department paper identified area of prospective cooperation with Dhaka—from counter terrorism to trade.

In February, U.S. officials met in Washington with Bangladesh’s army chief, and then involved in a corruption scandal. At the time, a U.S. Army speaker said the two armies “share a close partnership.” And just last month, senior State Department official Kelly Keiderling visited Dhaka and spoke of a wish to develop the relationship. The sanctions came just a few weeks later.

One possibility is the Biden administration has decided to make Bangladesh a major target of its democracy promotion movement. (This would clarify Washington’s decision not to invite Dhaka to last week’s democracy summit.) However this would fly in the face of Keiderling’s recent comments, signifying the United States sees Bangladesh as lacking enough tactical value to warrant a close partnership.

U.S. sanctions might also be a shot across the bow to warn Bangladesh about the risks of its increasing relationship with China. But that is also unlikely given that sanctioning Dhaka might drive it closer to Beijing. Bangladesh presently seeks to balance its associations with China, the United States, and India. But it might be more receptive to Beijing’s overtures if Washington continues to take aim at its human rights record.

Washington's sanctions strategy often carries unseen agendas. When America imposed sanctions on the Soviet Union after it invaded Kabul, they were billed as part of a mission to rescue Afghanistan, but they were really intended to warn Moscow not to march into Iran.

Applying the similar tactic, Americans are giving Bangladesh's Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina two messages: (1 ) penalize the named officers, and (2) join the Quad. Hasina's failure to comply, particularly with the second demand, is likely to subject Bangladesh to more sanctions.

The U.S. steps might embarrass Hasina on world stage; however sanctions in general hardly ever achieve their stated goal. Often they do just the opposite — make the recipient stiffer. Hasina will definitely not put her police chief on trial, since such a step will open up a Pandora's Box, putting her administration and her political future in risk. Even a dumb person knows that the RAB did not act randomly without approval from the top.

To concede the U.S. demands will make Hasina look weak to her followers in addition to adversaries. A weak leader is despicable in Asia—and perhaps in other parts of the world, too— particularly if one fails to stand up to big bullies.

This leaves the United States with the only expectation that its secret policy to coerce Hasina into the Quad will thrive. The prime minister is less than likely to bend over backwards to please Washington, simply owing to her fear to look weak, if nothing else. Can she afford to be on the wrong side of both India — which is playing second fiddle to America— and the United States at the same time? Her records point out, she can.

The more likely clarification is the United States just sought to push Bangladesh on its human rights record, not give up on the association. As one former Dhaka-based U.S. diplomat put it, “sanctioning RAB might well have just been a low hanging fruit given long standing concern about its actions.” On January 2022, a State Department spokesperson insisted the United States still seeks cooperation, and U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken had a call with his Bangladeshi counterpart, A.K. Abdul Momen.

But the damage is done. For Bangladesh, sanctioning the RAB is like an attack on an institute that has carried out triumphant counterterrorism and antinarcotics operations. In a perfect world, Dhaka would eradicate the RAB’s culture of impunity—resulting in the elimination of sanctions and a boost for U.S.-Bangladeshi relations. But actually, an increasingly undemocratic Dhaka is unlikely to rein the force in.