By S. Habib

Beijing has a long history of trade relations with almost all of the developing countries in South Asia. China's economic reforms in the region's geopolitics, and huge trade markets have strengthened her relationship in the region. The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) formerly called as One Belt One Road (OBOR), is a global infrastructure development strategy adopted by China in 2013 to invest in nearly 150 countries and international organizations. As of August 2022, 149 countries were listed as having signed up to the BRI. Belt is short for the "Silk Road Economic Belt" referring to the proposed overland routes for road and rail transportation through landlocked Central Asia along the famed historical trade routes of the Western Regions; whereas "road" is short for the "21st Century Maritime Silk Road", referring to the Indo-Pacific sea routes through Southeast Asia to South Asia, the Middle East and Africa.
Objective of BRI was "to construct a unified large market and make full use of both international and domestic markets, through cultural exchange and integration, to enhance mutual understanding and trust of member nations." The Belt and Road Initiative was to address an "infrastructure gap" and thus has the potential to accelerate economic growth across the Asia Pacific, Africa and Central and Eastern Europe. This project was planned to become a new economic corridor for different regions. It aims to link Southeast Asia, Central Asia, the Gulf region, Africa and Europe with a network of land and sea routes.
With reference to BRI project, a number of infrastructure projects are being implemented in Bangladesh in collaboration with China. Several of these works are nearing completion. Analysts believe that Dhaka has adopted ambitious plans around these projects on the way up the ladder of economic development. In April 2021, a special report was published in China Daily, a newspaper run by the ruling Communist Party of China, mentioning the importance of the Chinese project in the development of Bangladesh. It said Bangladesh plans to move from a least developed to a developing country by 2026. One of the keys to achieving this goal is China’s cooperation.
A number of infrastructure projects, including the $3.3 billion Padma Bridge under construction in Bangladesh, are part of China’s proposed Belt and Road (BRI) initiative. Other Chinese-funded projects in the country include the $1.1 billion Payra Power Plant, the $1.32 billion power grid development, and a $1 billion digitization project. It is true that if the projects under Chinese BRI are fully functional, Bangladesh would benefit hugely. The Chinese projects are boosting Bangladesh’s economy. Bangladesh is benefitting from the BRI.
Prime Minister of Bangladesh Sheikh Hasina had also spoken out in support of China. China is also Bangladesh's biggest arms supplier. Bangladesh signed 'China-Bangladesh Defense' 'Agreement' to cover military needs. In the current situation, the Bangladesh Defense Force has Chinese weapons, including warplanes, tanks, submarines, missile launchers and various weapons systems. Bangladesh had purchased two Chinese Ming-class submarines. In 2018 China spent more than $200 million for Bangladesh Air Force (BAF) to buy 23 Hongdu K-8W intermediate trainers. Defense relations are not only related to the import and export of weapons. China provides training for Bangladesh Army officers with joint Chinese and Bangladeshi army training. The Sino-Bangladesh defense relationship is so strong that the Chinese and Bangladeshi soldiers of both countries train at each other's Defense Academy, and the Bangladeshi army is more comfortable.
India is Bangladesh's permanent ally and neighbor, But Sino-Bangladesh relationship has become a source of anxiety for India, it has been criticized by most Indian scholars. Experts fear that growing Sino-Bangladeshi relations could destabilize Indo-Bangladesh's mutual confidence economically and politically, despite Bangladeshi diplomats undermining Dhaka's neutral and neutral stance between New Delhi and Beijing. Therefore, out of the proposed six international corridors (Hong Kong Trade Development Council [HKTDC], 2018; National Development Reform Commission [NDRC], 2015), four corridors, namely, the new Eurasia Land Bridge, China–Central Asia–West Asia Economic Corridor, the China– Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC) and the Bangladesh–China–India–Myanmar Economic Cooperation (BCIM), directly affect India’s economic and strategic linkages with these regions.
India perceives that the BRI initiative is nothing but an attempt by China to unsettle the established regional order and replace it with a China-centric system that would marginalise other major Asian powers such as India and Japan. India’s objections to BRI have mainly centred on the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), for an investment of USD 60 billion CPEC, which connects Gwadar Port in Pakistan’s Balochistan with China’s Xinjiang province, is the flagship project of the BRI. India is also vocally objecting to China over the CPEC as it is being laid through deputed area Kashmir.
Scholars of India working in the area of strategic studies still evaluating those components of the BRI, which will improve India’s connectivity to major markets and resource supplies is also of the view that except CPEC because of sovereignty issues, India should explore those portions of the BRI infrastructure or connectivity which ‘serve India’s interest in improving connectivity and economic integration with the Asian and global economy’. In addition, he argues that even limited implementation of the BRI ‘will markedly change the economic and strategic landscape within which we operate, and India must prepare for that change’ ‘there is no need to fear the OBOR– both the OBOR and China need India as a partner’ ‘Chinacentric system in Asia’ that will marginalize other powers like India. And ‘if India joins, it will mean that it accepts the inevitability of China’s supremacy in Asia’ India’s difficulty is that the BRI will massively strengthen China’s influence in ‘India’s neighbourhood and marginalise Delhi’s regional primacy’ India is now surrounded by BRI projects and through these, China is trying to ‘leverage regional security and stability in South Asia’. As New Delhi lacks resources for a counter strategy, he feels ‘all we are left with is our vacuous negative propaganda to malign the BRI for which there are no takers abroad.

Many scholars who focus more on economic issues see BRI as an opportunity. It is argued that India could take advantage from China’s overcapacity and infrastructure investment in Asia. Therefore instead of opposing, New Delhi should integrate some of the BRI initiatives into its own connectivity plans. This will significantly enhance India’s access to Eurasia. The sovereigntyrelated issues concerning the CPEC and broader geopolitical implications within the Indian Ocean Region have overshadowed other aspects on the initiative.
So, it is suggested count the interests of Bangladesh first. It is natural for Bangladesh that the developing economy of Southeast Asia, which is struggling with many social and economic problems such as poor infrastructure development, large population, unemployment and poverty etc. accepts all the opportunities and investments offered to develop it. Bangladesh gets this smooth ease from China. Rather than fearing for India or seeing China's approach only as an antidote to America's "pivot to Asia" policy or a debt trap for Bangladesh under the "policy of" China's checkbook ', China's investments are many productive opportunities to develop Bangladesh. This is not just because of Dhaka's trade neutrality or the desire to establish a relationship with China, but because of the decline in the number of creditors in Bangladesh projects in recent years.