By Ali HASSAN

Historically, the Indian Ocean has been a uniquely strategic and important region in world politics. In recent times, in the backdrop of great power competition, the Indian Ocean Region (IOR) is gaining particular attention as the new “pivot” of world politics. It has been the point of concern for both regional and extra regional entities for trade and other prospective.  Sri Lanka always had a maritime identity due to its geographical positioning. As an island nation, its connectivity with the rest of the world and its outside engagements have been through the Indian Ocean, which has always been integral to every aspect of Sri Lanka’s economic, political, and social life. And Sri Lanka has used this identity to its advantage.  Even in its initial years post-independence, Sri Lanka’s Indian Ocean identity was an integral part of its strategic, security, and political narrative.

Sri Lanka is coming under intensifying pressure to line up more fully with the US-led confrontation with China in the Indo-Pacific along with allies such as Japan and Australia, and its chief strategic partner in the region, India. Whereas U.S is smartly approaching Sri Lank in order to perceive its objectives in Indian Ocean. Further to polish its activities US is engaging Sri Lanka in strategic ties. Ensuring these ties, top U.S and Indian officials have held talks with leaders of the Sri Lankan government on June 2022 to further the campaign and focus on the strategic alliances. However, U.S. security strategy in the Indian Ocean reflects a combination of long-standing requirements and evolving priorities for U.S. national strategy in an era of great power strategic competition between the U.S. and both China and Russia.

Two U.S. objectives can be identified clearly. The first is protecting the free flow of commerce by escalating its tie with Sri Lanka which is regional actor. This region is strategically important for the flow of containers, bulk cargo, and hydrocarbon traffic that is critical for the global economy. The commanders of U.S. Naval Forces Central Command in Bahrain often speak about securing the free flow of commerce as a clear goal in Indian Ocean. The second U.S. objective which US is trying to attain  in the region is maintaining military access in the Indian Ocean, given that the U.S. is an extra regional power with no local territories and for that, Sri Lanka is easy access due to its geostrategic location

Most importantly, these two objectives are in service of a larger interest to ensure that the Indian Ocean does not assume greater priority for the U.S. than the increasingly interconnected Pacific, Arctic, and Atlantic theaters. Moreover, to combat regional security and economic crises U.S has found the grounds to enhance its influence as a donor and act as a big boss in the south Asian region, during the crisis, Washington has given Sri Lanka humanitarian and agricultural assistance and provided loans to the country’s private sector and claimed that U.S can do more before the emergence of such crises in Sri Lanka and other countries through U.S. development and financial efforts. Beyond bilateral assistance, the U.S. could leverage its influence on behalf of smaller states in multilateral institutions, such as the International Monetary Fund, the World Bank, and the G7 with its new Partnership for Global Infrastructure and Investment.

While the U.S. seeks to operate globally, this combined Pacific-Arctic-Atlantic theater registers greater priority than do the more distant waters of the Indian Ocean. Efforts such as “the Quad” permit the U.S. to engage in important strategic campaigning in the wider Indo-Pacific on issues such as maritime domain awareness and climate change, but the Indian Ocean segment remains a lesser priority. For example, no Indian Ocean region command (IORCOM) or fleet has yet emerged to consolidate areas of responsibility that currently fall across three combatant commands. Even the 2018 name change from Pacific Command (PACOM) to Indo-Pacific Command (INDOPACOM) did not result in a change in area of responsibility. In other words, according to expert opinions the Indian Ocean needs to remain a lesser priority for the U.S. as it juggles limited resources to apply globally in a new era of strategic competition. Given this focus, it is worth identifying wildcards that may complicate U.S. security interests in the Indian Ocean. Beyond the obvious ones, such as additional Chinese basing and gray zone activities in the Indian Ocean, the crisis in Sri Lanka suggests the potential for domestic crises in strategically located countries to have reverberations in the region.

But the strategic important of Indian Ocean is still important for U.S to play in combined Pacific-Arctic-Atlantic theater and ultimately, the U.S. does not seek a reduction in its Indian Ocean presence, as is evidenced by the Defense Department’s news release about the results of the Global Posture Review. Further, the U.S. has economic interests in preserving the free flow of commerce. Yet Washington does have growing requirements in the combined Pacific-Arctic-Atlantic Theater. Moving forward, U.S. policymakers will need to preemptively manage potential wildcards in order to keep crises from erupting in the vast Indian Ocean that would divert U.S. attention and resources away from other regions. The events in Sri Lanka are a timely reminder of the importance of this priority for the coming years of strategic competition.

The smart actions taken by US in maritime world politics are to become a hegemonic sole operator which is quite tough in this era of modernization. The developing states like Sri Lanka and other South Asian states have also become smart enough to be trapped but the economic failure somehow lead them towards hard time and compromise. The geostrategic virtue of Sri-Lanka shall always remain the point of hope and progress for island nation but it needs to act smartly to attain foreign policy objectives.